The Nisan-Wigderson pseudo-random generator [NW94] was constructed to derandomize probabilistic algorithms under the assumption that there exist explicit functions which are hard for small circuits. We give the first explicit construction of a pseudo-random generator with asymptotically optimal seed length even when given a function which is hard for relatively small circuits. Generators with optimal seed length were previously known only assuming hardness for exponential size circuits [IW97, STV01] .
Introduction

Background
A central question in Complexity Theory concerns the power of probabilistic algorithms. Such algorithms are allowed to use a string of independent coin tosses in their computation. Two different approaches for obtaining such a string resulted in rich and elaborate theories.
Pseudo-random generators:
The first direction (introduced by [BM84, Yao82] ) tries to see if probabilistic algorithms can function if given many fewer random bits than they want to use. The idea is to use a deterministic procedure, called a pseudo-random generator, to stretch these few independent bits (often referred to as the seed) into the appropriate length. The distribution produced should "look random" to all efficient algorithms. 
For a class A of such predicates, D is -pseudo-random for A if D -fools each A ∈ A. We'll be particularly interested in the following classes of predicates:
• The class of all predicates (on m bits): D is called -uniform if it -fools this class 1 .
• The class Size m of all predicates computable by circuits with m or fewer gates: D is called ( , m)-pseudo-random if it -fools this class. 2
We say that a function G : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a ( , m)-pseudo-random generator if the distribution G(U d ) is ( , m)-pseudo-random.
The reader is also referred to the excellent monograph [Gol98] devoted to this field and its varied connections to complexity theory, cryptography and learning theory. Perhaps the most important connection is that given such a generator, a simple nontrivial deterministic simulation of the given probabilistic algorithm follows. One simply runs the probabilistic algorithm on all outputs of the generator (varying over all seeds) and outputs the majority vote. As the running time of this procedure is exponential in the "seed" length it is thus crucial to reduce this parameter. Following Nisan and Wigderson we allow pseudo-random generators to run in time 2 O(d) and call such generators explicit 3 . We allow the running time to be exponential in the input length since in the simulation described above we intend to run the generator over all 2 d seeds anyway.
A major result in this direction was discovered in [NW94] . They showed that every difficult problem (in E = dtime(2 O(n) )) could be used to construct a pseudo-random generator. The quality of this NW-generator (i.e. its seed length) was shown to relate to the difficulty of the given function.
Given an extractor one can simulate probabilistic algorithm using only one sample from a highentropy defective source. This is done by sampling an element from the source and then running the algorithm on all outputs of the extractor (varying over all 2 d seeds) and taking the majority vote. It is easy to verify that this procedure simulates the probabilistic algorithm correctly. Again, minimizing the length of the seed is crucial for the efficiency of this conversion. The reader is referred to the excellent survey papers [Nis96, NTS99] on the many varied uses of extractors in complexity, combinatorics, coding theory and network design. A more recent survey [Sha02] covers recent developments in extractor constructions.
In a breakthrough result, Trevisan ([Tre01] ) showed that pseudo-random generators and extractors are intimately linked. He proved that any variant of the NW-generator (converting arbitrary hard functions into pseudo-random distributions) could be used to construct an extractor. Moreover, the seeds in both constructions are of the same length under this translation. [Tre01] (and then [RRV02] ) proceeded to use the NW-generator to give simple and direct constructions of extractors. For the same reasons as explained above, these constructions sometimes require nearly quadratic seed length in the "optimal" value (achieved by the non-constructive "optimal" extractor which can be proven to exist by a counting argument and has parameter matching the known lower bounds [NZ96, RTS00] ). Thus, improving the NW-generator will impact both pseudo-random generators and extractors. 
All results assume the existence of a function f = {f l }, f l : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} which is computable in time 2 O(l) , and that circuits of size k(l) cannot compute.
Results
In this paper, we construct both pseudo-random generators and extractors that have optimal seed length (by that we mean a seed length which is linear in the optimal value). Our pseudo-random generator gives an improved (and almost optimal) tradeoff between hardness and randomness. The improvement we get becomes more notable (compared to previous results) as the hardness assumption is weakened. 5 The extractors we obtain from this construction (using Trevisan's method) have the optimal seed length regardless of the amount of randomness present in the imperfect random source, and are thus the first for sub-polynomial entropies to have optimal seed length. Below we state our main Theorems formalizing the above. An important note regarding both pseudo-random generators and extractors is that while we achieve optimal seed length, the output length in both cases is suboptimal. We discuss this in more detail in Section 6.
Theorem 1.4 (Optimal seed generators).
If there exists a function f = {f l } which is computable in time 2 O(l) and for all l, f l cannot be computed by circuits of size k(l), then there exists 
there is an explicitly constructible family of (k, )-extractors Ext n,k, : {0,
We can do better for low entropy sources. We achieve a larger output in this case (whereas many previous constructions work better when the entropy is large). An example is the following 
The results are given for constant . δ is an arbitrary small constant.
Theorem in which we get a larger improvement in the number of extracted bits if the entropy is small.
Theorem 1.6 (Extractors for low min-entropy). For every > exp(−n/(log
Note that when k < 2 √ log n the seed length becomes the optimal O(log n). Using the method of [WZ93] the number of bits extracted can be enlarged at the expense of enlarging the seed length. 6 Using this we can improve the fraction of bits extracted to a constant fraction paying only a O(log log log n) penalty in the seed length. Corollary 1.7. For every constant δ > 0 and > exp(−n/(log * n) log * n ) there is an explicitly con-
A note on optimality of seed length
In [NZ96] (and later [RTS00] ) it was shown that the seed length of any (k, )-extractor which outputs more bits then its seed length must be at least Ω(log(n/ )). Thus, the seed length in our extractor construction is optimal except for the exact constant. In Section 5 we give evidence that the seed length in our construction of pseudo-random generators is also close to optimal. We now explain what we mean by this statement. We are concerned with the optimality of the reduction from a hard function to a pseudo-random generator. As we now explain, this poses some difficulties: Let's consider studying the case of converting a function f that is hard against say polynomial size circuits into a pseudo-random generator. Our construction 6 The basic idea of Wigderson and Zuckerman is that if an extractor E does not extract all the randomness from the source then additional randomness can be extracted by running another extractor with an independent seed. By repeatedly running this procedure an extractor with output length m = k/r and seed length d can be transformed into one with output length m = (1 − δ)k (here δ > 0 is an arbitrary small constant) and seed length d = O(dr). Exact details can be found for example in [RRV02] .
gives a generator which stretches l bits into l O(1) bits. However, it is widely believed that there are functions hard against much large circuits which in turn lead to better generators. How can we rule out the scenario in which the reduction ignores the function f altogether and uses a better available pseudo-random generators?
Below, we suggest two notions of optimality that address this difficulty and address the quality of the reduction from hard functions to pseudo-random generators rather than the quality of the pseudo-random generator itself.
• By Trevisan's argument ( [Tre01] , see also Theorem 2.8 and [KvM02] ) any construction which converts hardness into a pseudo-random generator and has some additional "relativization properties" gives an extractor with the same seed length. Thus, any such construction is bounded by the lower bounds on extractors cited above. Our construction of pseudo-random generators (as well as all previous constructions) has these "relativization properties". It follows that the seed length in our pseudo-random generator construction is optimal except for the exact constant. Exact details are given in section 5.1.
• It is possible to convert pseudo-random generators into hard functions. Roughly speaking, a pseudo-random generator with seed length l which fools circuits of size m(l) can be converted into a function on l bits which is hard for circuits of size m(l). It follows that if a conversion of hardness into pseudo randomness (even one which does not have the "relativization properties" mentioned above) does significantly better than our construction than it also yields a harder function than the one initially supplied to it. Exact details are given in section 5.2.
Technique
This section attempts to give a complete account of the sequence of ideas used to prove our results, at a semi-intuitive, semi-technical level, that will hopefully simplify the reader's task when reading the formal proof. Our goal is to transform a function f : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} which cannot be computed by circuits of size k into a pseudo random generator with optimal seed length:
m that fools circuits of size m for large as possible m. (Our final result has m = k Ω(1/ log log(l/ log k)) which falls slightly short of the desired m = k Ω(1) ). Our starting point is the NW-generator which uses a larger seed under the same assumption: 7
The proof of Nisan and Wigderson shows how to construct a circuit C which computes the function f given any circuit A which is not fooled by their generator. The circuit C is constructed by combining 7 This is not quite accurate. Actually the NW-generator starts from a slightly stronger assumption, that is that the function is hard on average for circuits of size k and not only hard on the worst case. We ignore this difference in the informal explanation because Sudan et al. [STV01] showed how to perform "hardness amplification" (that is transforming a function that is hard on the worst case into one that is hard on the average). The transformation of [STV01] doesn't significantly affect the parameters of the function and therefore in this informal discussion we always assume without loss of generality that a hard function is actually hard on average. The precise details are given in the technical part.
A with a circuit C that computes some function f (which we elaborate on momentarily). Such a function f (which depends on f and A) is shown to exist. In order to guarantee that C is "small", Nisan and Wigderson have to make sure that f has a small circuit C . They achieve this by setting the parameters so that f is a function over very few bits (and therefore has a small circuit by a trivial exponential bound). However, it turns out that the size of the input of f depends on the seed length of the generator. If f is not assumed to be extremely hard, Nisan and Wigderson have to increase the seed length to guarantee that f has a small enough circuit to contradict the hardness assumption.
The main idea of this paper is a "win-win analysis" which uses the NW-generator with the "wrong" parameters. We set the seed length to the optimal d = O(l) regardless of k, that is regardless of how hard is the hard function f . (In contrast to the setting by Nisan and Wigderson in which the seed length is set to O(l 2 / log k).) This is not guaranteed to produce a pseudo-random generator as the circuit C constructed by the argument of Nisan and Wigderson may be too large. However, if this happens and the Nisan-Wigderson argument fails to show that the generator is pseudo-random, then f does not have a small circuit. More precisely, f requires a circuit of size roughly the same as that of the best circuit for f . The parameters are chosen in a way that guarantees that the input length to f is smaller than that of f (say only a half of the input size of f ). Thus, (since we measure the complexity of functions relative to the length of their input), f is actually much harder than f ! We conclude that when setting the parameters this way, either we obtain a pseudo-random generator with optimal seed length or we obtain a harder function than the one initially supplied.
We then use this idea recursively trying to construct a generator from f . Once again either we construct a pseudo random generator with optimal seed length or we obtain a harder function. Eventually, if we fail to construct a pseudo-random generator we obtain a function which is extremely hard (a function on l bits that requires circuits of size 2 Ω(l ) ) and can use the standard Nisan-Wigderson analysis to construct a pseudo-random generator. Thus, our construction can be viewed as a reduction from the general case of arbitrary hardness to the solved case of exponential hardness.
The main complication when trying to implement the argument above is that the identity of the function f is determined by a probabilistic argument -it only shows the existence of such a function but does not tell us how to find it. More precisely, the argument shows that we can index 2 O(l) functions, one of which is the required one. Considering all these potential functions at all levels of recursion, we can picture a tree. The root is labelled by the initial function f . The descendants of a node labelled by a function g are the (2 O(l) ) functions which may arise as f when using the NW-argument on the function g. We consider such a tree. By choosing the parameters carefully we get that the tree is of height O(log log(l/ log k)) and the leaves are functions on only O(log k) inputs.
One can construct a generator from all functions labelling nodes of this tree. This approach produces many (roughly 2 O(l) ) candidate generators. We claim that one of them is guaranteed to be pseudo-random. If none of the generators in the internal nodes is pseudo-random then there must be a function at a leaf which has hardness roughly k. Such a function has exponential hardness and thus the generator constructed from it is pseudo-random by the Nisan-Wigderson argument.
To complete the construction we show how to "combine" all the candidate into a single pseudorandom generator. 8 Two natural ideas come to mind.
• In every node of the above tree replace the functions f 1 , · · · , f 2 O(l) by a single function with two arguments:f (i, x) = f i (x). Certainly, if one of the candidate functions is hard so is the "concatenated" function.
• Combine all the candidate generators by running them with independently chosen seeds and take the exclusive-or of the outputs. Certainly, if one of the candidates is pseudo-random, so is the xor-generator.
Both ideas fail in our setting due to the huge number of candidates. The first idea will cause the input size off to be significantly larger than that of any of the f i 's as the length of i is larger than l. We will no longer have thatf is over fewer bits than f and will not be able to deduce that f is harder than its ancestor. The second idea blows the seed length by a factor of the number of candidate generators.
However, both ideas are essential components of our construction. In order to be able to use them we need to reduce the degree of the tree from 2 O(l) to poly(k), where k is the hardness of the original function f . Assume for the moment that this can be magically done. Once achieved, the first idea is applicable since the length of the added input is now at most O(log k) (which will not drastically increase the input length of functions in the tree). In other words, a tree of such a small degree (poly(k) can be collapsed into a path whose length is the depth of the tree.
Since this path is of small length O(log log(l/ log k)), we can now apply the second idea and xor these few candidate generators. We avoid even the small loss to be suffered because of their number by arranging the seed lengths of different levels to go down geometrically.
The missing important step is cutting down the degree of the tree from 2 O(l) to k 2 . This requires a slightly finer inspection of the argument of Nisan and Wigderson. We show that when we fail to produce a pseudo-random generator, not only one of the descendants of the function is hard, but rather a non-negligible fraction of them, (more precisely a 1/k-fraction). Thus, if we randomly sample k 2 descendants we almost surely "hit" a hard one if it exists. We will only run the recursion on these k 2 descendants. Of course, trivial sampling costs more random bits than we can afford, but this can be done just as well with pairwise independence. This additional randomness is added to the seed and increases the seed length of the generator only by O(l) bits which we can indeed afford. This completes the argument.
There is however some price to performing this recursion. The circuit lower bound we can guarantee for f is slightly smaller than we can guarantee for f . (If f requires circuits of size k, we can only guarantee that f requires circuits of size k/m O(1) ). This loss is accumulated over the log log(l/ log k) levels and causes us to have output length m = k Θ(1/ log log(l/ log k)) rather than
This difficulty can be avoided when applying Trevisan's technique for constructing extractors. In such a case the hardness measure can be changed from circuit size to description size, (which we define formally using Kolmogorov Complexity). This is beneficial because the procedure which constructs a circuit for f given a circuit for f can be described using many fewer bits than the size of the final circuit. Using this measure the hardness guarantee we get on f is much larger,
, and as a result, we can increase m and extract any polynomial fraction of the initial entropy and at the same time simplify the argument. random candidate.
History of this paper
This paper is the combination of two conference papers by the same authors. The first paper, [ISW99] included the idea of using the NW-generator with the wrong parameters and performing the "win-win" analysis. We then constructed all candidate generators in the tree, and showed how to combine them into a hitting set generator with optimal seed length. This in turn suffices for derandomizing two-sided error probabilistic algorithms using the results of [ACR96, ACRT99] . We also gave a more direct argument in which we conduct a "tournament" between all the candidate pseudo-random generators. While we cannot guarantee that the winning candidate is a pseudorandom generator, we can guarantee that it could be used to derandomize a given probabilistic algorithm on a given input. This gives a derandomization of BP P .
The second paper, [ISW00] performed the combination of candidate generators into a single pseudo-random generator and constructed optimal seed extractors. The version presented here is mostly based on that paper.
Organization of the paper
In section 2, we define pseudo-random generators and extractors, state our exact results, and present the necessary background definitions and results. In section 3, we present our main construction, and prove that it "transforms hardness into pseudo-randomness". In section 4, we show how to deduce our results from the main construction. In section 5 we discuss notions of optimality for pseudo-random generators. In section 6, we discuss open problems and mention subsequent work.
Definitions and Ingredients
Notation Let U m be the uniform distribution on m bit strings, and let x ∈ D {0, 1} m mean that x is selected from all m bit strings according to probability distribution D. For a function G on d bits, we use G(U d ) to denote the distribution obtained by applying G on a random sample from U d .
Complexity measures for functions and strings
We identify between functions f : {0, 1} l → {0, 1} and strings in {0, 1} n=2 l in the obvious way setting f i = f (i). This identification is helpful since we use two complexity measures: circuit complexity (which is defined for functions and is the measure we use for constructing pseudorandom generators) and Kolmogorov complexity (which is defined for strings and is the measure we use for constructing extractors). For both measures, we argue that our construction transforms a "hard" function/string into a "pseudo-random" distribution. The exact meaning of this statement is that if a test A is not fooled by the "pseudo-random" distribution then A can be used as an oracle to compute/describe the initial function/string. This is why we define circuit complexity and Kolmogorov complexity relative to a predicate A. 
Definition 2.1 (circuit complexity). Let
Pseudo-random generator schemes
Trevisan, [Tre01] discovered that any conversion of hard functions into pseudo-random generators with certain "relativization properties" also gives extractors. The following definition summarizes these properties.
Definition 2.3. A (k, )-pseudo-random generator scheme is a function
G : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m
with the following property: For any f ∈ {0, 1} n and predicate
A on m bits, if G f does not -fool A then S A (f ) ≤ k. We
say that a family of pseudo-random generator schemes is explicit if it can be computed in time polynomial in n.
Note that given an explicit pseudo-random generator scheme any hard function can be used to construct a pseudo-random generator by "plugging" the truth table of the hard function as the first input to the pseudo-random generator scheme. We use the following notation: x) and call it the generator derived from G by h.
The following Lemma immediately follows.
Lemma 2.5. Assume there exists a function
We remark that the condition that d(l) ≥ l is unnecessary as we later show that any pseudrandom generator scheme has d(l) ≥ l.
Proof. (of Lemma 2.5). For every l we consider G l = G f l . That is we supply the truth table of f l as the first input of G. We compute G l by first computing the truth table of f l (which takes time 2 O(l) ) and then feeding it to G. The total time is polynomial in 2 l . If
Trevisan observed that all known hardness versus randomness tradeoffs actually construct explicit pseudo-random generator schemes. Our construction is no exception. He also proved that any such scheme is an explicit extractor. It turns out that for this connection it is more natural to replace circuit complexity by Kolmogorov complexity. 
It immediately follows that a pseudo-random generator scheme is an extractor scheme.
Lemma 2.7. Any (k, )-pseudo-random generator scheme is a (O(k log k) , )-extractor scheme.
Proof. This follows because any circuit of size k can be described by O(k log k) bits.
The converse is not necessarily true. The following Theorem, (by [Tre01] ) asserts that extractor schemes are extractors. [Tre01] ) Any (k, )-extractor scheme is a (k + log(1/ ), 2 )-extractor.
Theorem 2.8. (implicit in
Proof. Let Ext be a (k, )-extractor scheme, let A be any test, and let P be a distribution with min-entropy at least k + log(1/ ). The bias of A on Ext(P, U d ) is the expectation for h ∈ P {0, 1} n of the bias of A on Ext h . For all but 2 k h's, the latter bias has absolute value less than . The at most 2 k exceptions have total probability at most . Therefore, the total bias is at most 2 .
There is also a partial converse:
Proof. Let Ext be a (k, )-extractor. Let H A be the set of all h so that Ext h does not -fool A. H A is constructible using A as an oracle, so K A (h) ≤ log |H A | + O(1) for any h ∈ H A . Without loss of generality, assume that, for half the elements h in H A , A is more likely for an output of Ext h than for a random element. Then the same is the case if h is chosen uniformly from this subset of H A , and x is chosen uniformly, and we compute A (Ext(h, x) ). Thus, by the definition of extractors, this distribution on A has min-entropy less than k , i.e., |H A |/2 < 2 k or log |H A | < k + 1.
Following Trevisan, we use Theorem 2.8 to reduce the problem of constructing extractors into proving hardness versus randomness tradeoffs.
The Nisan-Wigderson generator
Almost all schemes of converting hardness into pseudo-randomness, as well as some extractor constructions, use the NW-generator from [NW94] . Their construction converts a "hard" Boolean function f on l bit inputs, into a pseudo-random generator taking an input seed of size d > l to an output of length m >> d. To use the construction for derandomization, one needs to specify the hard function f , and a family Δ of subsets of {1, · · · , d} such that each pair of sets has small intersection. Such families are called "designs", and the intersection sizes determine the quality of the pseudo-random generator. 
Definition 2.10 (designs). A family of sets
Given Δ, f and x as inputs, NW Δ (f, x) can be computed in polynomial time in (n, d) and in particular NW f,Δ (x) can be computed, given Δ, in time polynomial in m, with an oracle for f . The proof that the NW construction is a good pseudo-random generator involves looking at certain restrictions of f . 
Definition 2.14. Given an
. We refer to these functions as the "restrictions" of f . Note that the input size of each such restriction is u + log m.
Note that given Δ and a function f (encoded as a n = 2 l bit truth 
The conclusion of Lemma 2.15 is that when given oracle access to a test A which is not fooled by the NW-generator we can use g to compute f (or the negation of f ) correctly on a 1/2 + Ω( /m) fraction of the inputs. For completeness we give a proof of Lemma 2.15. We need the following theorem which is a variant of the "distinguisher to next-bit predictor" lemma of [Yao82, GM84] 
Proof. (of Lemma 2.15) Let (b 1 , · · · , b m ) denote the distribution NW f,Δ and let A be a test that is not -fooled by this distribution. We now explain how to construct the machine M . Recall that the machine is given uniformly chosen (x, i, α, β).
We first think of i and α as fixed and show how to use the oracle access to f Δ i,β to generate the distribution b 1 , . . . , b i from the randomly chosen x and β. We start by using x and β to construct a seed s for the generator. Let us denote the elements of S i by {a 1 < · · · < a l }. For each p ∈ S i , we set s p = β p . We fill the remaining l places with x by setting s av = x v . Note that s is uniformly distributed when x, β are uniformly distributed and therefore the distribution NW f,Δ (s) is identical to (b 1 , · · · , b m ). We now have the following equalities.
[NW94] prove that NW
f,Δ is -pseudo-random for all tests computable in size S 1/2−Ω( /m) (f )/(m2 u ). This means that the existence of functions which are "hard to approximate" implies the existence of a pseudo-random generator.
With the above terminology, the original argument of [NW94] can be presented this way: [NW94] uses designs with very small u, (which in turn forces d to be relatively large). This makes the circuit complexity of all the f Δ i,β 's relatively small. Lemma 2.15 shows that any circuit A of size m which is not fooled by NW f,Δ can be combined with the circuits for the restricted functions to construct a circuit of size poly(m)2 u which approximates f . Thus, if f is assumed to be hard to approximate by such circuits, the distribution induced by the generator is pseudo-random for Sizem.
The observation that the proof of Nisan and Wigderson relativizes was made in [KvM02] . This observation is important for Trevisan's extractor, [Tre01] . The observation added here is that the argument of Nisan and Wigderson connects the complexity of f and its restrictions.
10 The standard variants of this argument transforms a distinguisher for the distribution b1, · · · , bm into a predictor which when given b1, · · · , bi−1 predicts the next bit bi. In this variant we only demand that the predictor output is correlated with the bit bi (but not necessarily positively correlated). Nevertheless, the standard proof of this theorem works by first achieving this goal and then choosing whether to keep the output bit or flip it. We settle for this weaker notion because we want a uniform reduction which uses few random bits. However, we could have replaced the machines in both Theorem 2.16 and Lemma 2.15 with nonuniform circuits which would have allowed us to use the standard version and get almost the same results.
•
We get that for all j < i, b j can be computed from x and β using f Δ i,j,β . Thus, having oracle to f Δ i,β we can compute b 1 , · · · , b i−1 . We now use the Turing machine of Theorem 2.16 to give a good estimate on b i = f (x).
The Lemma above can be used to connect the complexity of the original function, that of the restricted functions, and the power of the generator.
Corollary 2.17. If NW f,Δ does not -fool A, then for an Ω( /m) fraction of pairs β and i: S
Corollary 2.17 gives that if NW f,Δ does not fool A, then some of the restrictions can be used to show that f is "easy", (at least in the sense that there exists a small circuit that uses A gates and "approximates" f ). As we explained in the introduction, this is useful since all the restrictions are on only u + log m bits.
Proof. (of corollary 2.17) By Lemma 2.15 if NW f,Δ does not -fool A, then by averaging there exists an α ∈ {0, 1} m such that:
By a Markov argument this gives that for a Ω( /m) fraction of pairs (β, i):
Fix such a pair of β and i. We have that the output on a uniformly chosen x is correlated with f (x). The equation above can be expressed in the following form: There is a bit b ∈ {0, 1} so that
By "hard-wiring" α, b, β, i and the circuit for f Δ i,β to M , we get the circuit promised in the Corollary.
An analogous argument can be used to state Corollary 2.17 for Kolmogorov Complexity. It turns out that by considering Kolmogorov complexity the same argument gives much better parameters! This happens because in the Kolmogorov complexity setting, the running time of M doesn't count. We only have to specify (α, b, β, i) . The total length of these strings is m + O(log m) ≤ 2m. Note that as we only need to specify these strings we get an additive term and not a multiplicative term.
Corollary 2.18. If NW f,Δ does not -fool A, then for an Ω( /m) fraction of pairs β and i:
K A,1/2−Ω( /m) (f ) ≤ K A (f Δ i,β ) + 2m
Xoring generators
We need a technique for combining many candidate generators where one of them is guaranteed to fool a test A. We'd like to "xor" them all on independent seeds to get one generator. A technical inconvenience is that the "xor generator" does not necessarily fool A. Proof. Suppose P i is -pseudo-random for A ⊕ . Without loss of generality, assume i = r.
Fix z 1 , · · · , z r−1 arbitrarily and let y = z 1 ⊕· · ·⊕z r−1 . We know that P r -fools A ⊕ y, and therefore
The price of Lemma 2.20 is that if you have two candidate generators
This means that "xoring" many generators blows up the seed length. We want to only increase the seed length of a single generator linearly. We will be able to avoid increasing the total seed length by more than a constant factor over that of G 1 by making sure that the seed lengths are decreasing exponentially.
Let us rephrase corollaries 2.17, 2.18, and replace A by A ⊕ . This change does not affect the parameters by much. To convert a circuit using A ⊕y gates to one using A gates, we can replace the A ⊕y gates with A gates, and negate wires going to the i'th input of an A ⊕y gate if y i = 1. This gives:
Corollary 2.21. If NW f,Δ is not -pseudo-random for A ⊕ , then for an Ω( /m) fraction of pairs β and i: S
As to Kolmogorov complexity, note that by giving y, we can convert a machine with oracle access to A ⊕y into one with oracle access to A.
Corollary 2.22. If NW f,Δ is not -pseudo-random for A ⊕ , then for an Ω( /m) fraction of pairs β and i: K
A,1/2−Ω( /m) (f ) ≤ K A (f Δ i,β ) + 4m
Hardness Amplification
The above connections relate the quality of the generator and the complexity of the specified restrictions to the complexity of approximating the function f , i.e., computing a function f that has non-negligible correlation to f . 
(List decoding and Kolmogorov Complexity). The first item in Theorem 2.23 explicitly appears in [STV01]. The second item which concerns Kolmogorov complexity immediately follows from the construction of [STV01] as we now explain. A list decodable code is a mapping C from n bits ton > n bits such that every A ∈ {0, 1}n has few f ∈ {0, 1} n such that C(f ) is close to A in Hamming distance. In other words given a list decodable code and A ∈ {0, 1}n any f for whichf = C(f ) is close to A has small description size K A (f ). The construction of [STV01] is of a list decodable code C which runs in polynomial time. The second item in Theorem 2.23 follows.
Combining this with the corollaries from the last section gives the following analogous results for circuit complexity and Kolmogorov complexity. Note that again the same argument produces more efficient parameters in the Kolmogorov complexity setting.
Corollary 2.25. If NWf ,Δ is not -pseudo-random for A ⊕ , then for an Ω( /m) fraction of pairs β and i: S
A (f ) ≤ S A (f Δ i,β )(m/ ) O(1)
Corollary 2.26. If NWf ,Δ is not -pseudo-random for A ⊕ , then for an Ω( /m) fraction of pairs β and i: K
The above Lemmas give the same intuitive connection between the hardness of the function f and its restrictions. The difference is that now we measure "worst-case" hardness in both sides of the inequality. This enables us to use these corollaries recursively.
A recursive application of the Nisan-Wigderson generator
In this Section we give our main construction and prove its correctness.
The construction
We use the same construction both for pseudo-random generators and extractors. Our goal is to construct a function Rec : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m . Below we explain how to construct the function Rec when given parameters n and m and a function Base that serves as the base of the recursion.
Ingredients:
• An integer n (the desired length of the first input of Rec).
• An integer m < n (the desired output length of Rec).
• A function Base : {0, 1} m 6 ×{0, 1} d Base → {0, 1} m . This is going to be an extractor/pseudorandom generator that is going to be the base of the recursion.
The inputs of Rec: The function Rec : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m gets inputs f ∈ {0, 1} n and y ∈ {0, 1} d . Let l = log n. Let c 3 be a constant to be determined later, and let r be a parameter to be determined later. We define a sequence of integers
We interpret the string y as a sequence of three parts defined as follows:
• A string s Base of length d Base .
• A string s composed of r strings s 1 , · · · , s r where for each 1 ≤ t ≤ r, s t ∈ {0, 1} dt . Note that as the d i 's are a geometric progression the total length of s is bounded by 2d 1 = 2c 3 log n.
• A string p composed of r strings p 1 , · · · , p r where for each 1 ≤ t ≤ r, p t ∈ {0, 1} 4dt . Note that the total length of p is bounded by 8d 1 = 8c 3 log n.
By this choice d = 10c 3 log n + d Base which is O(log n) + d Base as we have promised.
The operation of Rec:
The function Rec constructs r + 1 function f 1 , · · · , f r+1 . This is done recursively as follows:
• Set f 1 = f and l 1 = l.
• For t > 1 we now explain how to construct f t+1 : {0, 1} l t+1 → {0, 1} from f t : {0, 1} lt → {0, 1}.
• Letl t = 4l t . Apply Theorem 2.23 on f t and obtains the functionf t : {0, 1}l t → {0, 1}.
dt , log m) where c 1 is the constant from Theorem 2.12. Apply Theorem 2.12 to construct a (l t , u t )-design Δ t using d t as the "d-parameter" of the design (recall that this measures the size of the universe in which the sets live).
• We define z t = NWf t,Δt (s t ) (that is applying the Nisan-Wigderson generator with the (hardness amplified) version of f t using the seed s t ).
• Use p t as randomness to pick m 4 elements in [m] × {0, 1} dt in a pairwise independent way. Let's denote these elements by (i t,q , β t,q ) for 1 ≤ q ≤ m 4 . 11
• For each 1 ≤ q ≤ m 4 we consider the function (f t ) Δt (it,q,βt,q) : {0, 1} log m+ut → {0, 1} defined in Definition 2.14. We then define f t+1 : {0, 1} 4 log m+log m+ut → {0, 1} by:
We define l t+1 = 5 log m + u t (so that l t+1 is the input length of f t+1 ).
11 Note that using linear functions (cf. [CG89] ) choosing less than 2 a pairwise independent elements in {0, 1} a can be done using 2a bits. Thus, we need 2(dt + log m) random bits. Recall that dt ≥ ut ≥ log m and therefore the total number of random bits required is at most 4dt and we can use pt for this purpose.
• We showed how to define l t+1 , u t+1 and f t+1 using l t , u t and f t . We continue this process recursively and let r be the first integer so that u r = log m. The recursion stops at this point having defined f r+1 .
Finally, let z Base = Base f r+1 (s Base ) and the final output of Rec is
As explained in the introduction, the main idea in the construction above is to maintain that if the Nisan-Wigderson generator fails to fool a test A when applied with the functionf t then assuming f t is "hard to compute/describe using A" we get that f t+1 is even harder.
Before showing that the construction produces pseudo-random generators and extractors we first need to verify that the construction above is well defined. That is that the recursive process above terminates. This is done in the next lemma that gives a bound on r (the number or applications of the recursion). In addition the lemma also asserts that when the recursion stops the last function f r is over only O(log m) bits.
Lemma 3.1. The constant c 3 in the construction can be chosen so that for any n, m the recursion terminates, and when it does r ≤ log log log n log m and l r+1 = 6 log m.
Proof. Recall that the recursion continues as long as u t > log m. We now study the behavior of u t in these steps. We first derive a bound on u t+1 as a function of u t . Recall that l t+1 = u t +5 log m ≤ 6u t assuming the recursion does not stop at this step. It follows thatl t+1 = 4l t ≤ 24u t and u t+1 is given by
where here we also used the fact that d t = c 3 l/2 t−1 . Suppose we have for some t that
(Note that this is indeed the case for t = 1 with i t = 1, j t = 2 and k t = 0). Then using the bound we derived for u t+1 we get that:
We conclude that (1) holds for all t ≤ r with:
• i 1 = 1 and i t+1 = 2i t + 1 which gives i t = 2 t − 1.
• j 1 = 2 and j t+1 = 2j t which gives j t = 2 t
• k 1 = 0 and k t+1 = 2k t + t which gives
For some constant c 4 > 0.
Thus, we have that:
We can pick c 3 large enough as a function of c 1 , c 4 so that
It follows that there is an r ≤ log log l log m = log log log n log m such that u r = log m and the recursion stops. By definition l r+1 = u r + 5 log m = 6 log m.
The Lemma above also implies that Rec can be computed in time polynomial in n. 
Correctness of the construction
We now state two lemmas showing that our construction yields pseudo-random generators and extractors when applied with the correct ingredients. . The final quality of Rec (that is its k parameter) is larger than k Base by a factor that depends on the number of levels of the recursion.
Proof of correctness for pseudo-random generator schemes
We now give the proof of correctness for pseudo-random generator schemes.
Proof. (of Lemma 3.3) Let r be the number of steps in the recursion. By Lemma 3.1 we have that r ≤ log log log n log m . We need to show that there exists a constant c > 0 such that Rec is a (k Base m cr , 1/m)-pseudo-random generator scheme. Let c be a constant to be chosen later and let k = k Base m cr . It remains to show that given any f ∈ {0, 1} n and a predicate A on m bits such that S A (f ) > k then Rec f 1/m-fools A.
For every 1 ≤ t ≤ r we define the following two events over the probability space of choosing p = (p 1 , . . . , p r ):
the exclusive-or of r + 1 independent distributions z 1 , · · · , z r and z Base (each generated using its own seed 
Proof of correctness for extractor schemes
We now give the proof of correctness for extractor schemes. The argument is similar to that of pseudo-random generator schemes with the exception that we measure hardness by Kolmogorov Complexity. We give the full proof for completeness.
Proof. (of Lemma 3.3) Let r be the number of steps in the recursion. By Lemma 3.1 we have that r ≤ log log log n log m . We need to show that there exists a constant c > 0 such that Rec is a (k Base + rcm, 1/m)-extractor scheme. We choose c = 5 and let k = k Base + rcm. It remains to show that given any f ∈ {0, 1} n and a predicate A on m bits such that
For every 1 ≤ t ≤ r we define the following two events (over the probability space of choosing p = (p 1 , . . . , p r ):
Note that as f t+1 "contains" (f t ) Δt it,q,βt,q we have that given a machine with oracle access to A that describes f t+1 we can construct a machine with oracle access to A that computes (f t ) Δt it,q,βt,q . Thus, we get that:
and E 2 t occurs as required.
We define E 1 = ∪ 1≤t≤r E 1 t and E 2 = ∩ 1≤t≤r E 2 t . By the Claim above we have that Pr 
We now consider the case that the fixing p = (p 1 , · · · , p r ) makes E 2 occur. If this is the case then 
Proof of the main Theorems
In this section we show how "plugging" different bases to our construction gives the previously stated Theorems.
Pseudo-random generators
The generator of Theorem 1.4 can be achieved by using the generator of [IW97] (or the simplification of [STV01] ) as Base. The generator of [STV01] works by first applying their hardness amplification scheme (Theorem 2.23) on the hard function f to obtain a functionf and then using the NisanWigderson generator withf . In fact, this generator is a component in our construction, and so we do not really need a "base function". (In the formal proof we use a "bogus" base function that is constant so that we can apply Lemma 3.3). We first restate Theorem 1.4 in the more general terminology of pseudo-random generator schemes:
Theorem 4.1. For every k < n there is an explicit (k, 1/m)-pseudo-random generator scheme E : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} O(log n) → {0, 1} m with m = k Ω(1/r) for r = log log log n log m . Proof. Given n and k let l = log n and c be the constant from Lemma 3.3 and choose m to be the largest integer so that m cr+6 ≤ k. Note that m = k Ω(1/r) . We use a "bogus" Base function. Let Base : {0, 1} m 6 × {0, 1} 0 → {0, 1} m be the constant zero function. As any function over 6 log m bits has a circuit of size k Base = m 6 it follows trivially that Base is a (k Base , 1/2m)-pseudorandom generator scheme. Applying Lemma 3.3 we get that Rec : {0, 
Extractors with large error
In this Section we apply our technique to construct extractors. Our technique is tailored towards constructing extractors with error = 1/m. We explain how to get lower error in the next section.
Achieving seed length O(log n):
We use Trevisan's extractor as Base:
Theorem 4.2. [Tre01] For every δ > 0 there is an explicitly constructible family of (k, 1/m)-
Applying Lemma 3.5 we obtain the following Corollary: 
Applying Lemma 3.5 we obtain the following Corollary:
Corollary 4.5. There is an explicitly constructible family of 
Extractors with small error
Our technique yields extractors with rather large error, ( = O(1/m)). In [RRV99] it was shown how to transform an extractor with large error into one that works for arbitrary small error . When one starts with error = O(1/m), this transformation increases the seed length only by an inevitable and optimal additive factor of O(log 1 ). The transformation of [RRV99] slightly hurts the output length. The extractor one gets only extracts a constant fraction of the randomness extracted by the initial extractor. This does not matter in our case since we lose a constant fraction of the randomness anyway. We now formally state the transformation of [RRV99] . Performing this transformation on Corollaries 4.3,4.5 gives Theorems 1.5,1.6.
Notions of optimality for pseudo-random generators constructions
In this section we examine two notions of optimality for pseudo-random generators constructions, and show that our construction comes close to optimal in both notions.
Pseudo-random generator schemes give extractors
Our construction of pseudo-random generators gives a (k, 1/m)-pseudo-random generator scheme G : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} O(log n) → {0, 1} m for every log n < k < n and m = k Ω(1/ log log( log n k )) . We now show that the seed length in this construction is optimal except for the exact constant by giving a lower bound on the seed length of every pseudo-random generator scheme.
Lemma 5.1. For every log n < k < n, every (k, 1/3)-pseudo-random generator scheme with m > d has d = Ω(log n).
Proof. By Lemma 2.7 a (k, 1/3)-pseudo-random generator scheme is a (O(k log k), 1/3)-extractor scheme. By Theorem 2.8 every extractor scheme is an extractor. It was shown by [NZ96, RTS00] that every extractor with m > d has d = Ω(log n).
Pseudo-random generators imply hard functions
In this section, we show how to convert a pseudo-random generator into a hard function. It follows that a pseudo-random generator construction which does significantly better than ours also gives a harder function than the one initially supplied to it. We remark that the same conclusion holds even if G is a "hitting set generator", (see [ISW99] ).
Proof. (of Lemma 5.2) We define a function f = {f l } f l : {0, 1} l → {0, 1}. Given an l bit input x, we define f l (x) to be 1 if and only if there exist some z ∈ {0, 1} m(l)−l for which x • z is an output of the generator G on l − 1 bit long inputs. We claim that S(f l ) > m(l) since any circuit C computing f is not 1/2-fooled by G. This is because C always answers 1 when given the output of the generator, and answers 1 with probability at most 1/2 when given a uniformly chosen input. (Note that there are at most 2 l−1 possible outputs of G on l −1 bit long inputs). f can be computed in time 2 O(l) by generating all outputs of the generator G on l − 1 bit strings.
Conclusions, open problems and subsequent work
We have shown how to improve the Nisan-Wigderson generator, to use optimal seed length for arbitrary hardness. However, there still remains a small gap between the output length of our pseudorandom generator and that of the best expected generator. (Namely, we get m = k Ω( 1 log log(l/ log k) ) whereas we expect to get m = k Ω(1) ). In a subsequent work, [SU01, Uma02] give a new construction of pseudo-random generator schemes which does not use the Nisan-Wigderson generator and achieves m = k Ω(1) .
There's also a gap between the output length of our extractor construction and the optimal extractor, here the gap is quantitively smaller (since using Kolmogorov complexity we get m = k 1−δ ). However we are more picky in the parameters when it comes to extractors and the optimal extractor achieves m = k + d − 2 log(1/ ) − O(1). In subsequent works [RSW00, TSUZ01, SU01, LRVW03] this gap is made smaller, however existing constructions do not achieve the optimal output length with seed length O(log n). The reader is referred to a survey on extractor constructions [Sha02] .
Our construction works by reducing the problem of constructing extractors for general sources to that of constructing extractors for sources with polynomial min-entropy. In retrospect, this transformation can be seen as a condenser that is a function Con : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} O(log n) → {0, 1} k O(1) such that for any distribution P with min-entropy at least k the output distribution Con(P, U O(log n) ) is (close to) a distribution with min-entropy very close to k. (The final step towards constructing an extractor is running some prespecified "base extractor" on the output distribution of the condenser). A related approach was used in the subsequent [TSUZ01] to construct "lossless condensers" in which preserve all the min-entropy in the source distribution P .
